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Contract Law.  Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education 
v. Hellenic Society Paideia – Rhode Island Chapter, 202 A.3d 931
(R.I. 2019).  Parties agreed to arbitrate claims of breach where
arbitration provision provides that “any controversy, claim or
dispute”1 be arbitrated where breach is mentioned in a preceding
provision regardless of a “[r]emedies” provision, which entitles an
aggrieved party to “all rights and remedies allowed at law.”2
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 2005, the University of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island 
Board of Governors for Higher Education3 (Plaintiffs) agreed to 
lease a portion of the University’s Kingston campus to the Rhode 
Island Chapter of Hellenic Society Paideia (Defendant), who would 
then build a center for the Hellenic Studies Program at the 
University.4  In 2012, after the ground was excavated and the 
foundation laid, construction came to a halt and never resumed.5  
In November of 2012, Plaintiffs sent a Notice of Default and 
Termination of Ground Lease to the Defendant notifying Defendant 
of Plaintiff’s intent to terminate the lease because the building had 
not been finished within thirty months of beginning construction, 
as provided for in the lease.6  In June of 2013, Plaintiffs sent a 
second letter, demanding the Defendant restore the land to its 
previous condition.7  
1. R.I. Council on Postsecondary Educ. v. Hellenic Soc’y Paideia – R.I.
Chapter, 202 A.3d 931, 936 (R.I. 2019). 
2. Id. at 938.
3. The Rhode Island Council on Postsecondary Education is a public
corporation holding legal title to all property owned by the University of Rhode 
Island.  Id. at 933 n.1. 
4. Id. at 933.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 933-34.
2020] SURVEY SECTION 593 
After years of unsuccessful negotiation between the parties, 
Plaintiffs brought a petition in the Superior Court to appoint a 
special master to resolve the parties’ dispute.8  Shortly thereafter, 
Plaintiffs amended their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment 
that Defendant breached the lease by not completing construction 
within thirty months.9  As a consequence of the breach, Plaintiffs 
sought an order that the Defendant either restore the land to its 
previous condition or that Defendant reimburse Plaintiffs the cost 
of doing the same.10  Pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws 
section 10-3-3, Defendant moved for a stay of litigation pending 
arbitration, arguing that Section 14.3 of the lease required the 
parties to arbitrate their disputes.11 Section 14.3 reads, in 
pertinent part: 
14.3 Conciliation; Arbitration. 
14.3.1 Conciliation – In the event of any controversy, claim 
or dispute arising out of or relating to this Lease or with 
respect to any breach hereof, the parties shall seek to 
resolve the matter amicably through mutual discussion 
. . . . 
14.3.2 Arbitration – If the parties fail to resolve any such 
controversy, claim or dispute by amicable arrangement and 
compromise within the thirty (30) day period immediately 
following the date of the notice initiating such discussions 
referred to in subsection (a) above . . . the aggrieved party 
shall submit the controversy, claim or dispute to 
arbitration . . . .12 
The hearing justice found that the language of Section 14.3 of 
the lease “did not mandate arbitration in this case” and denied 
Defendant’s motion for a stay of litigation.13  In reaching that 
decision, the hearing justice noted that while the conciliation clause 
referred to “any controversy, claim or dispute arising out of or 
relating to this Lease or with respect to any breach hereof,” the 




12. Id. at 935–36.
13. Id. at 934.
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arbitration clause did not include “with respect to any breach 
hereof.”14  Therefore, according to the hearing justice, the difference 
between the two clauses created a limitation on the arbitration 
clause; and because the arbitration clause did not include the 
language “with respect to any breach hereof,” the parties did not 
intend to arbitrate issues of alleged breach.15  After making that 
finding, the hearing justice denied Defendant’s motion for a stay of 
litigation.16  In response, Defendant moved for reconsideration of 
the order, but the hearing justice affirmed his previous ruling.17  
Subsequently, Defendant timely appealed, arguing that the 
hearing justice erred by concluding that the arbitration clause in 
the lease did not apply to an alleged breach.18 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Before reaching the merits of whether the parties’ dispute was 
arbitrable, the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) addressed 
Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendant’s appeal was not properly 
before the Court.19  Plaintiffs argued that an order denying a 
motion to stay litigation is not a final order until the issue is 
arbitrated, thus only reviewable by writ of certiorari.20  However,  
any party aggrieved by any ruling or order . . . may obtain 
review as in any civil action, and upon the entry of any final 
order provided in § 10-3-3 . . . he or she may appeal to the 
supreme court as provided for appeals in civil actions.21   
In the Court’s view, of particular importance in the statute is the 
phrase “any [aggrieved] party” may appeal “any ruling”.22  The 
Court found that the Defendant here was aggrieved when the trial 
court denied Defendant’s motion to stay litigation pending 
arbitration once the trial court found no arbitrable issue.23  
14. Id. at 936.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 934.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 934–35.
20. Id. at 935.
21. Id. (citing 10 R.I. GEN LAWS § 10-3-19).
22. Id. (emphasis in original).
23. Id.
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Therefore, the Court held that the language of section 10-3-3 was 
intended to allow direct appeals from orders on motions to stay 
litigation brought under the statute.24  Accordingly, Defendant’s 
appeal was properly before the Court.25 
The Court next turned to the issue of whether the alleged 
breach was arbitrable.26  The Court viewed the central issue as 
determining whether the parties “agreed to arbitration in clear and 
unequivocal language.”27  The Court turned to the language of 
Section 14.3 of the lease itself.28  The Court noted that, in finding 
breach was not an arbitrable issue, the hearing justice must have 
determined the “[c]onciliation” and “[a]rbitration” clauses were in 
conflict with one another, and therefore applied the “specific over 
general” rule to determine which clause would apply to allegations 
of breach.29  The Court reasoned that the hearing justice’s result 
would follow when looking at the “Conciliation” and “Arbitration” 
provisions separately.30  However, the Court noted that reading the 
two provisions separately was error, reasoning that “in ascertaining 
what the intent [of the parties] is [the Court] must look at the 
instrument as a whole and not some detached portion thereof.”31 
The Court held that Section 14.3.1 of the lease required the parties 
to put in a good faith effort to settle “any controversy, claim or 
dispute arising out of or relating to this Lease or with respect to any 
breach hereof.”32  Then, the Court explained the process of 
conciliation, which, under the agreement, required discussions 
24. Id. (quoting Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England, Inc. v.
Gelati, 865 A.2d 1028, 1037 (R.I. 2004) (“When the language of a statute is 
clear and unambiguous, we must enforce the statute as written by giving the 
words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning.”)). 
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (quoting State Dep’t of Corr. v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 866 A.2d
1241, 1247 (R.I. 2005)). 
28. Id. at 935–36.
29. When two contractual provisions are irreconcilable with one another,
the specific provision is considered an exception to the more general provision 
and the specific provision must apply.  Id. at 936 (citing Park v. Ford Motor 
Co., 844 A.2d 687, 694 (R.I. 2004)). 
30. Id.
31. Id. at 934, 936 (quoting Hill v. M. S. Alper & Son, Inc., 256 A.2d 10, 15
(R.I. 1969)). 
32. Id. at 937.
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between the parties via telephone or in person meetings.33  
However, should those conciliation efforts fail, the arbitration 
clause would be engaged.34   
Additionally, the Court noted Section 14.3.2 starts with “[i]f the 
parties fail to resolve any such controversy, claim or dispute . . . .”35  
Despite Section 14.3.2 making no specific mention to allegations of 
breach, the Court found that by using the word “such,”36 the 
arbitration provision must refer to the conciliation provision 
immediately before it, which did refer to breach.37  The Court found 
that when Section 14.3.1 and Section 14.3.2 are read together, the 
two provisions created a two-step process for resolving disputes.38  
Accordingly, in the Court’s view, the two provisions could be read 
to avoid conflict with one another, and the “specific over general” 
rule did not apply.39   
Plaintiffs also argued that even if Section 14.3 requires the 
parties to arbitrate allegations of breach, Section 10.2.140 gave 
Plaintiffs the option to litigate disputes if they so chose.41  Section 
10.2.1 provides that in the event of default, “[l]andlord may 
terminate this Lease upon thirty (30) days written notice to Tenant 
and, in addition to any right or remedy set forth herein, shall have 
all rights and remedies allowed at law or in equity or by statute or 
otherwise.”42  According to Plaintiffs, “all rights and remedies 
allowed at law” includes the right to bring a civil action in court.43  




36. Id.  “[T]he word ‘such’ when used in a contract or statute, must, in
order to be intelligible, refer to some antecedent, and will generally be 
construed to refer to the last antecedent in the context[.]”  Id. (quoting Am. 
Smelting and Refining Co. v. Stettenheim, 177 A.D. 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917)) 
(alterations in original). 
37. Id.
38. Id. at 936.
39. Id. at 936–37 (citing Park, 844 A.2d at 694).
40. Article X of the lease provides for particular remedies in the event of
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Management,44 where the Court held that, although the parties’ 
agreement required them to arbitrate certain issues, a “rights and 
remedies” provision in that agreement gave the parties an option to 
litigate disputes.45  However, the Court distinguished the present 
case from AVCORR Management, noting that the arbitration clause 
in AVCORR Management was limited to disputes arising only 
under specific circumstances rather than the breadth of the 
arbitration provision here, which provides that “any controversy, 
claim or dispute” is referable to arbitration.46  Further, the parties 
in AVCORR Management specifically consented to the jurisdiction 
of the Rhode Island courts in the event of “any dispute arising out 
of [the] [a]greement[.]”47  Thus, the Court held that, without 
limning specific issues eligible for arbitration or consenting to the 
jurisdiction of Rhode Island courts, the reservation of rights and 
remedies provision here merely directed the arbitrator to have all 
types of remedies allowed at law available.48   
In reaching its conclusion, the Court found of particular 
importance that Section 10.2.1 used the words “rights and 
remedies” together rather than using each word individually.49  
The Court explained that when used alone, “rights” would refer to 
the means available to a particular party to obtain its redress, 
including litigation, and “remedies” would refer only to the 
particular redress that may be available for an aggrieved party.50  
However, since the words appear as “rights and remedies,” the 
Court concluded that Section 10.2.1 gives an aggrieved party the 
opportunity to seek redress if that party’s rights under the 
44. AVCORR Mgmt., LLC v. Central Falls Det. Facility Corp., 41 A.3d
1007, 1010 (R.I. 2012). 
45. R.I. Council on Postsecondary Educ., 202 A.3d at 938.  Plaintiffs noted
that the title and language of the provisions in question in the instant case 
contained similar language as the provisions in AVCORR Management.  Id. 
(citing AVCORR Mgmt., 41 A.3d at 1009). 
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id. (quoting AVCORR Mgmt., 41 A.3d at 1012).
48. Id.  In reaching that decision, the Court relied on cases from the Sixth
Circuit and Massachusetts Appeals Court, both holding that rights and 
remedies provisions do not render an arbitration clause meaningless.  Id. at 
938–39 (citing Robert Bosch Corp. v. ASC Inc., 195 Fed. App’x 503 (6th Cir. 
2006) and Dixon v. Perry & Slesnick, P.C., 914 N.E.2d 97 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2009)). 
49. Id. at 939.
50. Id.
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agreement have been breached.51  Finding that breach was an 
arbitrable dispute under the agreement, the Court held the “rights 
and remedies” language gave the parties the “right” to arbitrate an 
alleged breach, and provided the arbitrator may provide redress 
with any appropriate remedy available at law.52  The Court went 
on to note that even if it found that Section 10.2.1 provides the 
parties an option to litigate breach, the Court adheres to the United 
States Supreme Court’s practice in “resolving any doubt in favor of 
arbitration.”53 
After concluding that the parties intended to arbitrate claims 
after attempting to resolve any disputes through conciliation, the 
Court found that the parties made extensive efforts to conciliate the 
dispute over the years given the extensive amount of 
correspondence sent between the parties; therefore the alleged 
breach was eligible for arbitration.54  Accordingly, the Court 
vacated the Superior Court’s denial of stay of litigation and 
remanded to enter a stay of litigation pending arbitration, as 
provided by Rhode Island Law.55 
Chief Justice Suttell disagreed with the Court’s holding; he 
found that the absence of the phrase “or with respect to any breach 
hereof” in Section 14.3.2 meant that the parties did not intend to 
arbitrate allegations of breach.56  Chief Justice Suttell agreed that 
the word “such” in Section 14.3.2 must have been referring back to 
Section 14.3.1, but posited that the provisions under Article X 
enumerate a number of remedies available in the event of default.57  
Looking to the heart of the dispute between the parties, Plaintiffs 
were complaining about Defendant’s failure to finish construction 
within the thirty-month time frame required under the lease.58  In 
Chief Justice Suttell’s view, the lack of “with respect to any breach 
hereof” in Section 14.3.2 and the language of Section 10.2.1, which 
allowed for “all rights and remedies allowed at law” in the event of 
default, must mean that the parties did not intend to arbitrate 
51. Id.
52. Id. at 940.
53. Id. (quoting Brown v. Amaral, 460 A.2d 7, 10 (R.I. 1983)).
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing 10 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-3).
56. Id. at 941.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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allegations of breach.59  Accordingly, Chief Justice Suttell found 
that denial of the motion to stay litigation was appropriate and the 
parties could litigate this dispute given they did not explicitly agree 
to arbitrate issues of breach.60 
COMMENTARY 
The Court found that the lease called for arbitration in the 
event of alleged default despite the absence of clear language that 
an alleged breach was an arbitrable dispute in Section 14.3.2 
because it referred to Section 14.3.1, which did include the language 
“any controversy, claim or dispute.”61  In doing so, however, the 
Court seems to overlook Section 10.2.1, providing for specific 
remedies in the event of default, which is, after all, what the dispute 
was about.62  While acknowledging that whether a party can 
arbitrate a particular dispute depends on whether they intended to 
arbitrate that particular dispute, the Court seems to have 
overlooked the principle of looking at the entire agreement in 
determining the parties’ intent.63  It seems the Court looked at 
Section 14.3.1 and Section 14.3.2 together, but ignored how those 
provisions relate to Section 10.2.1.64  Granted, the “Conciliation; 
Arbitration” provisions were closer in proximity to one another than 
to Section 10.2.1, but the provisions must be considered as part of 
the whole document in determining the intent of the parties.65  
Chief Justice Suttell highlighted that the clear language of the 
arbitration provision was silent as to breach, while breach was 
clearly discussed in Section 10.2.1.66  Therefore, the parties seem 
to have contemplated the possibility of breach, but left it out of 
Section 14.3.2 for some reason.67  The Court seemed to couch its 
opinion on the notion that the “rights and remedies” language in 
Section 10.2.1 was meant to supply the arbitrator with the remedies 
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 937.
62. See id. at 934, 941.
63. See id. at 934.
64. See id. at 936–37, 939.
65. See id. at 934.
66. Id. at 941.
67. See id.
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available to provide relief, but pays no mind that Section 10.2.1’s 
purpose is to address remedies in the event of default, which of 
course, was the precise issue in the present dispute.68  
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that parties agreed to 
arbitrate allegations of breach where the arbitration clause only 
refers to breach in the immediately preceding provision, and any 
rights and remedies provision thereafter is intended to direct the 
arbitrator as to the proper recourse of a particular dispute, not to 
provide the parties an option to litigate disputes not specifically 
identified in the arbitration provision. 
Jeffery Rankel 
68. See id. at 937–39.
